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This study investigates the impact of the business cycle on real wages using a rich data 
set that matches each employee to an employer. The major innovation that this study 
brings to academic research is the use of two disaggregated variables as cyclical 
components: Job Finding Probability (JFP) and Job Separation Probability (JSP). Real 
wages react positively with the business cycle showing a procyclical behaviour. When 
JFP, JSP and the unemployment rate increase by 1 p.p., controlling for worker and firm 
heterogeneity, the real wage of a male worker that has an ongoing job, changes by 
0.53%, -3.49% and -1.24% respectively. On the other hand, the real wage of a female 
worker changes by 0.42%, -0.43% and -0.85% with the same cyclical variables.1 
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1. Introduction 
“The question of the influence on real wages of periods of boom and depression has a 
long history” Keynes (1939, p.35) 
 
Keynes’s quote shows that the question of the reaction of real wages to the business 
cycle has intrigued economists for a long time. Several theoretical approaches have 
been developed, some supporting the idea that real wages are countercyclical (Keynes 
(1939)), some assuming that real wages are procyclical (Barro and King (1984)), and 
others arguing that real wages are insensitive to the business cycle (Lucas (1977)). 
                                                             
1 I am thankful to Professor Pedro Portugal for restless dedication, enthusiasm and availability all the way 
through the realization of this study. I would also like thank to all people that in one way or another made 
the conclusion of this study possible.    
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The first empirical studies regarding the real wage cyclicality were carried out using 
aggregate data. This type of data have some issues that might have contributed to the 
ambiguity in the conclusions reached by those papers. Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) 
and Brandolini (1995) surveyed several studies regarding real wages and the business 
cycle showing that the ones using aggregate data are very sensitive to changes in price 
deflator, measure of nominal wage, cyclical variables and time period. The fact that 
aggregate data treats the labour force as homogenous is its major weakness, since it 
does not take into account changes in the composition of the workforce over the cycle.  
The lack of heterogeneity in the labour force creates a countercyclical bias on the 
aggregate real wage. The occurrence of this bias can be explained with the vulnerability 
of unskilled workers. Due to this vulnerability, unskilled workers are more susceptible 
to layoffs, having then a higher share in the aggregate real wage during expansion and a 
lower one during recessions. Therefore, when a boom occurs, these workers will be 
hired, creating a downward pressure on the average wage. Many authors found evidence 
that the compositional bias exists and has a significant impact2.   
Recently, studies have been elaborated using a longitudinal data set for the US and the 
UK. These studies have reached a similar conclusion: real wages have a procyclical 
behaviour. The use of micro data, allied with the possibility of controlling for worker 
heterogeneity, eliminates the specification bias. Besides the absence of this bias this 
type of data allows to investigate the behaviour of real wages for different types of 
workers. The types of worker whose real wage cyclicality has intrigued investigators the 
most are the newly hired and job changers workers. 
A job changer is a specific type of newly hired worker which comes from other firm 
when hired. This worker real wage is more cyclical than the aggregate real wage. Some 
                                                             




authors have been devoting their studies to this topic in order to understand what drives 
this cyclicality. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), and Okun (1973) provided explanations 
for this fact concluding that job changers are made worse off in recessions. Barlevy 
(2001) took a different standing and, in his opinion, job changers are not made worse 
off, they are equally well off. 
The newly hired specification does not make any assumption about the origin of the 
worker before being hired; for example, he could come from out of the labour force or 
other firm. The real wage cyclicality of this type of workers had a crucial impact on the 
discussion of the unemployment volatility puzzle. Several authors tried to solve this 
puzzle using the real wage reaction to the business cycle. The unemployment volatility 
puzzle is a critique from Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005) to the standard search and 
matching model (Dale Mortensen and Chris Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000)). 
This model decomposes the unemployment rate in two flows: the flow into 
unemployment - job destruction, and the flow out of unemployment - job creation. The 
equilibrium unemployment rate is achieved when these two flows are equal and 
stationary.  
Shimer (2005a) argued that Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model, with a realistic 
calibration of the economy, cannot replicate the labour market dynamics, in particular 
the business cycle fluctuations of unemployment, vacancies and consequently the high 
procyclical volatility in job finding rates. This is, in essence, the so called 
unemployment volatility puzzle. The assumption of Nash bargaining wage employed by 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is pointed by Shimer to be the main reason why the 
model is unable to generate fluctuations. According to Shimer (2005a), this type of 
wage setting absorbs the incentives to open new vacancies when a productivity shock 
occurs, since the higher wages exhaust the benefits of this shock. This problem can be 
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solved by imposing wage rigidity. When a shock occurs, if wages are rigid, firms are 
the ones that absorb most of the impact of that shock, since they cannot pass part of it to 
their employees through wages. Thus, firms demand of labour will react more to 
economic conditions creating more volatility in unemployment and vacancies.   
To emphasize that this rigidity is the solution for the unemployment volatility puzzle, 
Shimer (2004) made the needed adjustments to the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
model and demonstrated that when the expected present value of wages is rigid in all 
matches, the unemployment volatility puzzle is solved.   
Hall (2005) shares a similar view with respect to the model of Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1994). He also calibrated the model to incorporate wage rigidity. Hall (2005) designed 
a bargaining set such that, once the wage is agreed, it never changes unless a positive 
surplus match is at risk. This kind of adjustment also creates more volatility in 
unemployment and vacancies. 
In a different view, Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sontag and Rens’ (2007) argue 
forcefully that the wage that has impact in the employment dynamics, influencing the 
decision of opening or not a vacancy, is the wage of newly hired workers and not the 
aggregate wage. When firms open a vacancy, they take into account the costs of having 
the vacancy open and the expected net profits that they will have with a match, which 
depends only on the newly hired wage. Haefke, Sontag and Rens (2007) found that the 
ongoing jobs have in fact rigid wages but the wage of the newly hired workers responds 
one to one to labour productivity shocks. Since the rigidity of wages in old matches is 
not enough to explain the volatility in unemployment (Shimer (2004)) and wages of 
newly hired workers are so cyclical, wage rigidity is no longer a viable candidate to fill 
the amplification mechanism that generates unemployment volatility. 
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Therefore, the study of real wage cyclicality is very challenging since the answer to this 
topic has several implications in theoretical models and in practical issues.  
In this study we explore a very rich longitudinal matched employer-employee data set 
and estimate the real wage cyclicality for Portugal using an iterative algorithm that 
yields the same solution of OLS.   
The main innovation of this study is the use of a disaggregated cyclical variable. Studies 
that use micro panel data, employ aggregate variables as proxies for the cycle. 
Therefore, there is a huge wedge between the number of values of the cyclical 
component, which are much less than one hundred, and the number of observations for 
real wages, that are millions. With a disaggregated variable this wedge is  attenuated. 
Using the search and match approach to unemployment, we compute the individual 
probability of an unemployed worker becoming employed (job finding) and the 
individual probability of an employed worker becoming unemployed (job separation). 
These probabilities will serve as cyclical components in this study. 
These disaggregated variables have another advantage since workers will have a 
personal cyclical variable adapted to their characteristics. Therefore, when economic 
conditions change, the impact of these changes on workers will be higher or lower 
according to their characteristics.     
The estimation of wage cyclicality in this study will account for the two sources of 
heterogeneity and composition bias, the worker and firm effect, allowing us to control 
these effects. 
 Finally, we inspect the difference in the wage cyclicality of stayers and newly hired 
workers, in the same firm, along the lines suggested by Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, 
Sontag and Rens (2007). 
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This study will be organized as follows. Section 2 explains the Portuguese wage setting. 
In Section 3 data and methodology are explained. The results are presented in section 4 
and finally section 5 concludes 
2. The wage setting in Portugal 
2.1. Collective Bargaining 
The Portuguese Constitution warrants the right for trade unions to bargain and defend 
the interests of its members3. Most of the unions represent workers by industry. Firms 
may also be represented, but unions only represent 10% of the total number of firms in 
Portugal.   
It is important to distinguish between two types of bargaining systems: Conventional 
and Mandatory. The conventional bargaining system occurs when the wage agreement 
is set by representatives of employees and employers. On the other hand, mandatory 
regimes occur when the wage agreement does not result from a negotiation between 
employers and employees, but is decided by the Ministry of Labour. This regime is 
implemented when workers are not covered by unions or when unions and employers 
do not reach an agreement. Usually, the government extends the collective agreements 
to firms that have non unionized workers. Therefore there are few differences between 
agreements for workers that are covered by unions and the ones that are not. 
Occasionally, government, unions and employers’ representatives meet to establish 
guidelines for wages and income policies and set minimum conditions that firms must 
offer to their workers. These meetings are denominated as the “social concertation”4. 
Since the outcome of the established agreements between unions and workers relate to 
industry level, firms often adjust the regulation  to their specificity. In some cases, these 
                                                             
3 The subsequent agreements are considered labour law 




adjustments imply paying wages above the ones determined at the bargaining table. (see 
Cardoso and Portugal (2005)). 
Despite the occurrence of negotiations between unions and employers and the fact that 
almost all workers are covered by unions or mandatory extensions, the Portuguese 
bargaining system has some degree of decentralization.  The pointed reasons for this 
decentralization are the fragmentation of the structures of unions and employers 
associations and the possibility of occurring adjustments and bargaining at the firm 
level.  
 
2.2. Minimum Wages 
The minimum monthly wage was settled in Portugal in 1974. At that time, it covered 
workers that were at least 20 years old and excluded agricultural and domestic servants. 
Currently, the minimum wage is mandatory to every worker. The apprentices are an 
exception to the rule, as they may receive solely 80% of the amount. Under proposal of 
the government5, the Parliament updates the mandatory minimum wage every year. In 
2006, the minimum wage was 385.90 Euros. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data description 
This study employs two data sources: Quadros de Pessoal – QP and Inquérito ao 
Emprego - IE. 
QP is a longitudinal data set that matches each employee to an employer. This data is 
collected by the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity in an annual survey which is 
mandatory to every establishment, even if it only has one wage earner. This survey 
                                                             
5 In 1982, the minimum wage was not updated and it was updated twice in 1989. 
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covers almost all the Portuguese labour force, only excluding Public administration, 
domestic servants and agriculture workers.   
The fact that QP collects detailed information makes it a very rich and unique data set. 
This survey has information about every establishment (location, industry and 
employment), firm (location, industry, employment, sales, ownership and legal setting), 
worker (gender, age, education, skill, occupation, admission date, earnings and duration 
of work) and earnings (base wage, regular benefits, non-regular benefits, overtime pay, 
mechanism of wage bargaining, normal and overtime hours of work).  
QP is also a very reliable dataset due to its public availability and the low degree of 
measurement errors. Additionally, it assigns an unique identification number6 to firms 
and workers that is continuously checked by the Ministry to avoid duplications. With 
these ID numbers, workers and firms can be followed throughout time. QP’s 
information ranges from 1986 to 20067. 
The data used in this study include full time workers aged between eighteen and sixty 
years old. Workers from Madeira, Azores and those whose explanatory variables are 
missing in some year are excluded.  To minimize the effects of the presence of outliers 
1% of the distribution of wages (the top and the bottom) is dropped. The whole data set 
includes 3.624.505 workers, which 2.111.056 are males and 1.513.449 females. While 
Male workers have jobs in 295.338 different firms, female workers have jobs in only 
268.768 different firms. 
Several studies concerning the cyclicality of real wages restrict their sample to workers 
employed for at least two consecutive years in an attempt to use first differences and 
still take work heterogeneity into account. Since this study does not have this restriction, 
                                                             
6 This ID number is a transformation of the Social Security number 
7 Years of 1990 and 2001 are not available 
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we are allowed to regard the real wage behaviour for almost all the different types of 
workers in the labour force. 
The workers whose job duration with the current employer is less than 12 months are 
referred as “accessions”, whereas the others are named “stayers”.  
Inquérito ao Emprego is an employment survey computed by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística – INE. The major objective of this dataset is to characterize the Portuguese 
labour market, dividing the population in unemployed, inactive and employed. This 
dataset has forty four quarters ranging from 1998(1) to 2008(4)8.    
The data is collected by direct interview to individuals, where detailed personal 
information is obtained. The information includes the  labour status of each individual 
and of  the members of his/her household.   
Each household is surveyed six times, over six quarters. As a consequence, we can track 
each person through six consecutive periods and observe if there is any change in 
his/her labour status.  
The data used in this study ranges from 1998(1) to 2006(4) and includes individuals 
with ages between eighteen and sixty years old. Residents from Madeira and Azores are 
excluded, as well as workers employed in the agricultural and fishing sectors.  
The data set is computed by 32.696 unemployed workers (13.373 males and 15.366 
females) and 324.328 employed workers (167.933 males and 156.395 females). The 
only flows that will be taken into account are the flows from employment into 
unemployment and vice versa9. Herewith, over the observation period, 3.956 employed 
individuals became unemployed (1.909 males and 2.047 females) and 5.176 
unemployed individuals became employed (2.551 males and 2.625 females). 
 
                                                             
8Data for the fourth trimester of 1998 is not available 
9 Since flows out of labour force appear to be almost acyclical (Pissarides 2007) 
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3.2. Empirical Methodology 
This study is conducted in two separate phases. 
The first one will be the estimation of Job Finding and Job Separation probabilities 
using the IE dataset. In order to estimate transition probabilities a conventional Probit 
model will be used instead of the usual OLS.  
 
The estimating form for the Job Finding Probability is : 
 
=∝ + + ( + ) +            (1)
and, for the Job Separation Probability: 
 
=∝ + + ( + ) + ( + ) +  (2) 
Where  is the Job Finding Probability for individual i at time t and  is the Job 
Separation Probability per person and period; ∝  is a constant term,  represents 
dummy variables for the individuals’ characteristics common for both equations and  
represents industry characteristics that only affect JSP; 10 is the unemployment rate, 
per region and gender;   represents the interactions between the unemployment 
rate and the personal characteristics and  stand for the interaction between 
unemployment and the firms’ characteristics. Finally   and  are a normally 
distributed zero mean random term with an unit variance. 
                                                             
10 As wages are set in the beginning (until 1993) or at the end (from 1994) of the year there is a delayed 
relation between wages and the business cycle, therefore the unemployment rate of the previous year will 
be used instead of the one from the present year 
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After this estimation, the estimated coefficients are then used to determine individual 
probabilities. Ultimately, the workers’ data that interests us is the one included in QP 
data set and not in IE, given that QP is the dataset used to investigate the wage 
cyclicality. Therefore,  Job Separation and Job Finding individual probabilities are 
calculated for workers that are in QP using the coefficients estimated from the IE data 
set. 
The second phase of this study covers the estimation of real wage cyclicality. For 
estimation purposes, worker and firm heterogeneity are controlled for. To be able to 
control these forms of heterogeneity, we use fixed effects specification. 
Workers that only appear once in the data are  excluded with this procedure.      
The estimation form of the real wage cyclicality is calculated as follows: 
 
  =   + + + + + +           (3) 
Where log  is the natural logarithm of real hourly wages;   represents the workers’ 
characteristics that do not change over time, i.e. the worker fixed effect;  represents 
the firms’ characteristics that do not change over time, i.e. the firm fixed effect;  is the 
time trend and  its square;  is a vector with workers’ characteristics that change 
over time;   is a cyclical component where three variables are used: the Job 
Finding Probability that depends on individual characteristics and observed period of 
time; the Job Separation Probability that considers individual characteristics, period of 
time and firm characteristics, and the unemployment rate that depends solely on the 
period of time. A dummy for hirings is included to differentiate newly hired workers 




Finally, the coefficient of interest for this study, , reveals if real wages are 
countercyclical or procyclical. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Job Finding Probability and Job Separation Probability 
Job Finding Probability and the Job Separation Probability are estimated by running 
equations (1) and (2) respectively. Workers characteristics are controlled using 
categorical variables for age, school, education and industry (only for the calculation of 
JSP). Education is divided in five levels, where no formal education is the considered 
base category. Age is divided in eight different intervals, considering the interval 
between eighteen and twenty years old the group base. Region is divided according to 
the classification of NUTSII and has the Norte region as reference. Finally, the industry 
distinction is controlled using five dummy variables, where extractive industry is the 
benchmark industry. 
Table 1 exhibits the results for the marginal effects of the Job Finding Probability (JFP) 
using the IE dataset. The unemployment rate has a significant negative impact (-1.2% 
for males and -0.7% for females) in this probability implying a procyclical behaviour of 
JFP. Education and age also have a negative impact since more educated and older 
workers, males and females, have a lower JFP. Finally, all workers that work in a region 












Table 1: Marginal effects of the Probit estimation for the Job Finding Probability  




















































































































                                                             
11 All levels of education that are higher than or equal to a graduate level 
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Table 2: Marginal effects of the Probit estimations for Job Separation Probability 
Portugal, 1998(1)-2006(4) (Males=167.933 Females=156.395) 
                                                             













































































































































Table 2 presents the results for Job Separation Probability (JSP). Unemployment rates 
have a positive impact in the JSP (0.1% for both genders), reflecting a countercyclical 
behaviour of this probability. Higher education has a negative impact in JSP for males, 
while for females only the two highest levels have a lower JSP (Secondary Education 
and Graduate, Master and Doctoral Education).  Age has the same negative impact in 
males and females. Except Centro, all regions have a higher JSP than Norte for both 
males and females. 
As explained earlier, the coefficients for each variable are now estimated, which allow 
us to compute the probabilities for workers in the QP data set. 
Table 3 shows the range of values for these probabilities. Job Finding Probability has a 
higher mean and volatility than Job Separation Probability. The mean values of JFP and 
JSP are respectively 18.4% and 1.1% for males, and 15.4% and 1.7% for females. 
 
Table 3: Job finding and Job Separation Probabilities for workers in QP data set 







The fluctuations of Job Finding Probability and Job Separation Probability as the 
contribution of each flow to unemployment volatility are being subject to a significant 
number of studies.  
Shimer (2005b) argues in favour of Job Finding Probability being highly procyclical 
and Job Separation Probability slightly countercyclical, aside from 1980 onwards, when 
it becomes simply acyclic. Therefore, unemployment volatilities are mainly generated 
 Females 
Minimum Maximum Std deviation Mean 
Job Finding Probability 0.092 0.189 0.024 0.154 
Job Separation Probability 0.014 0.034 0.005 0.017 
 Males 
Minimum Maximum Std deviation Mean 
Job Finding Probability 0.142 0.227 0.024 0.184 
Job Separation Probability 0.010 0.013 0.001 0.011 
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by the flows out, while the impact of the flows in is irrelevant. These findings support 
the beliefs that Mortensen and Pissarides’ (1994) model does not explain unemployment 
volatility.    
Elsby, Michaels, Solon (2009) replicated Shimer´s calculations, finding out that the 
flow out of unemployment is highly procyclical with a significant impact in 
unemployment’s volatilities. Elsby el al. (2009) also noticed that the flow in is not 
acyclic as, it has a countercyclical behaviour in most recessions. These authors conclude 
that a “Complete understanding of cyclical unemployment requires an explanation of 
countercyclical unemployment inflow rate as well as procyclical outflow rate”.  
According to Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009), Shimer (2005b) reached different 
conclusions due to the use of aggregate data, which does not take into account the 
worker heterogeneity. When unemployment flows are disaggregated, it is possible to 
see the existence of three different types of workers: job losers, job leavers and job 
entrants. These three types of workers have a procyclical flow out, specially the job 
losers, with a higher flow. No problem arises from the aggregation of the outflow rates 
because they go in the same direction. The same conclusion cannot be reached 
regarding the inflow rate, since job losers have a countercyclical inflow rate, job leavers 
a procyclical rate and finally job entrants flow in is acyclic. When the job separation 
probability is aggregated, the flows that go in opposite directions cancel each other, 
leading to a wrong conclusion that the flow in is acyclic. 
This study takes into account these types of workers heterogeneity by computing Job 
Finding and Job Separation probabilities at the individual level. Figure 1 and 2 shows 
the behaviour of unemployment rate with JSP and JFP. JSP and unemployment rate 
present a similar behaviour. When JSP increases the unemployment rate follows this 
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opposite direction. The results in table 4 support these conclusions showing the 
correlation between these probabilities and the unemployment rate.  
Overall, table 4 and figure 1 and 2 show that both flows explain the unemployment rate 
and react to economic conditions, for both males and females. The flow that explains 
better unemployment, for males, is the flow out and for females is the flow in. These 
conclusions are achieved in part due to the fact that the unemployment rate is already in 
the computation of JFP and JSP. 
 
Figure 1: Job Finding Probability and Job Separation Probability for males 
 










Correlation between unemployment rate and job finding and job separations 
probabilities   
 Males Females 
Job Finding Probability -0.4497 -0.2709 
Job Separation Probability 0.2272 0.2799 
4.2. Real Wage Cyclicality 
The reaction of real wages to the business cycle is estimated using equation (3).  
The nominal wage is calculated dividing the total regular payroll13 by the total number 
of hours. This ratio represents the hourly earnings. Real wage is then computed 
deflating the hourly earnings by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at prices of 1986. The 
logarithm of this real wage is the dependent variable. This estimation takes into account 
work experience, using age and its square, as well as region and education of the 
worker.  
Table 5 contains the results for the wage cyclicality for males, using three different 
cyclical variables: Job Finding Probability, Job Separation Probability and 
Unemployment Rate.  
Despite the difference in the magnitude of the response of real wages with the three 
indicators, the direction is the same: real wages are procyclical. 
With an increase of 1 percentage point (p.p.) by Job Finding Probability, controlling for 
worker and firm heterogeneity, real wages increase by 0.53% for stayers and 0.55% for 
newly hired workers. The impact of this probability in real wages is somewhat limited, 
since in the analyzed period, JFP can increase by 8.5 p.p. 14 at most. Therefore the 
highest increase of real wages due to changes in this probability is 4.5% for stayers and 
4.7% for newly hired. 
                                                             
13Includes base wage, seniority payments and regular benefits 
14 See table 3 
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The impact of Job Separation Probability in real wages appears to be higher, since the 
elasticity between this probability and real wages is -3.49% for stayers and -3.35% for 
newly hired. 
The highest possible in JSP in this period is 0.3 p.p. 15 which implies a maximum 
decrease of real wages by 1.05% for stayers and 1.01% for newly hired.  
Finally, unemployment rate has a semi elasticity of -1.24% for stayers and -1.48% for 
newly hired, controlling for firm and worker heterogeneity. 
When real wage cyclicality is estimated only using OLS, without controlling for worker 
and firm heterogeneity, these results change, showing the importance of the two fixed 
effects. 
           
Table 5: Real wage reaction to the JSP, JFP and unemployment rate for males 
Portugal, 1986-2006 (N=13.740.886) 




OLS two fixed effects 
 Stayers Accessions Stayers Accessions 
     
Cycle variable: Job Finding 
Probability 
0.0017 0.0151 0.0053 0.0055 
Standard errors (0.0041) (0.0063) (0.0016) (0.0026) 
     
     
Cycle variable: Job Separation 
Probability 
-0.0731 -0.0597 -0.0349 -0.0335 
Standard errors (0.0297) (0.0062) (0.0124) (0.0026) 
     
     
Cycle variable: Unemployment rate -0.0044 -0.0227 -0.0124 -0.0148 
Standard errors (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0027) 
     
 
Table 6 shows the results of the real wage cyclicality for females with the same three 
cyclical indicators as used for males. The real wage of female workers is procyclical as 
                                                             
15 See table 3 
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the males real wage. The results on the real wage cyclicality of newly hired workers are 
the only ones that are not similar for males and females. A newly hired male worker has 
a more cyclical real wage than a worker in an ongoing job with JFP and unemployment 
rate. For females, the cyclical variables that create a higher real wage cyclicality for the 
same type of workers, are the JSP and the unemployment rate. 
 
Table 6: Real wage reaction to the JSP, JFP and unemployment rate for females 
Portugal, 1986-2006 (N= 9.112.126) 




OLS two fixed effects 
 Stayers Accessions Stayers Accessions 
     
Cycle variable: Job Finding 
Probability 
0.0003 0.0041 0.0042 0.0027 
Standard errors (0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0013) (0.0023) 
     
     
Cycle variable: Job Separation 
Probability 
0.0098 0.0388 -0.0043 -0.0051 
Standard errors (0.0128) (0.0350) (0.0050) (0.0140) 
     
     
Cycle variable: Unemployment rate -0.0009 -0.0070 -0.0085 -0.0100 
Standard errors (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0085) (0.0008) 
     
 
The only paper that tried to study the reaction of real wages to the flow in and out was 
Carneiro, Guimarães and Portugal (2009), but their conclusions are slightly different 
from the ones found in this study. These authors also concluded that real wages have a 
procyclical behaviour with the three cyclical components, but the reaction of real wages 
in their study is higher than the one find in this study. This difference can be explained 
by the fact that the Job Finding and Job Separation Probabilities in the former study 





The purpose of this study is the creation of a disaggregated cyclical variable to be used 
in the estimation of real wage cyclicality. This new cyclical component, allied with the 
use of two unique data sets provide a very robust evidence on real wage cyclicality 
which is such a challenging topic. 
In the best of our knowledge, real wage cyclicality was never tested using the kind of 
disaggregated variables created in this study. The use of this type of cyclical variables 
has a major importance mainly for one reason. This reason is the information gain 
obtained from the creation of a personal cyclical measure for each individual, since 
economic conditions have a higher or lower impact in each worker depending on his/her 
characteristics.  
We build two cyclical components based on the decomposition from the search and 
matching model, the Job Separation Probability and Job Finding Probability. Therefore 
this study has four main conclusions: 
First, Job Finding Probability and Job Separation Probability have the expected 
behaviour to the business cycle. While Job Finding Probability has a procyclical 
reaction to the business cycle, Job Separation Probability reacts negatively to the 
business cycle, having then a countercyclical behaviour. We also find evidence that 
volatilities of unemployment are explained by both probabilities which is, in part, 
against Shimer (2005b) arguments that the flow out is the only flow that explains these 
volatilities.  
Second, real wages are procyclical for both genders and for all workers irrespective of 
the three cyclical components: Job Finding Probability, Job Separation Probability and 
the unemployment rate. The real wage of stayers male workers, controlling for worker 
and firm heterogeneity, changes by 0.53%, -3.49% and -1.24% when the Job Finding 
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Probability, Job Separation Probability and unemployment rate increase by 1 p.p. 
respectively. For the same type of female workers, an increase of 1 p.p. in Job Finding 
Probability, Job Separation Probability and unemployment rate changes their real wage 
by 0.42%, -0.43% and -0.85% respectively.   
Third, the results on the magnitude of real wage cyclicality for newly hired workers are 
ambiguous. The real wage of this type of male worker has an elasticity with respect to 
the Job Finding Rate and Job Separation Rate of 0.55% and -3.35%, respectively, and a 
semi elasticity with respect to the unemployment rate of -1.48%. Recently hired male 
workers have a more responsive real wage than a male worker in a continuing job when 
the Job Finding Probability and the unemployment rate are the cyclical variables used in 
the estimation of real wage cyclicality. Newly hired female workers also have a more 
cyclical real wage with the unemployment rate but, contrary to males, Job Separation 
Probability creates a higher real wage cyclicality for this type of female workers. 
Finally, the conclusions in this study support the findings of Pissarides (2007) and 
Haefke et al. (2007) that the business cycle fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies 
cannot be explain by real wage rigidity. Despite the ambiguous conclusions about the 
degree of the real wage cyclicality for newly hired workers, these workers have a real 
wage that reacts strongly to the business cycle. Therefore, the real wage rigidity does 
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This appendix provides a simple explanation about the estimation technique used in this 
study. 
Controlling for group and individual heterogeneity while using extremely large data 
sets, such as the one used in this study, may pose a challenging computational problem. 
The number of dummy variables required to appropriately capture heterogeneity makes 
the usual estimation methods computationally too demanding. 
However there is an estimation technique that solves the computational problem and 
yields a solution equivalent to OLS: the partitioned algorithm16. A simple example 
showing how this algorithm works is presented below.  
                                                             
16 For more information about partitioned algorithms see Smyth, G. (1996) 
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A study wants to estimate equation A1 with only one fixed effect 
 
= + +          (A1)
Where X is an M x k matrix, D is a M x n dummy matrix and  and  are the vector of 
the unknown parameters. OLS estimators can be computed by minimizing the square of 
the residuals. In order to do so a set of equations known as the normal equations is 
required. A generic form of these equations is given below: 
=          (A2)
Solving each equation 
= ( ) ( − )
= ( ) ( − )
         (A3)
 
Estimation of a given vector of coefficients,  or  , is much easier if the least square 
solution of the other is known. Therefore the partitioned algorithm solution is based on 
the following  iteration: 
1. Find the initial values for  regressing of  on  
2. Compute the normal equation for   with the previous estimation of  and then 
estimate    
3. Estimate again the normal equation for   taking into account the value of 
  found in 2. 
4. Return to step 2 until convergence 
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The outcome of this algorithm will be exactly equal to the OLS solution but in a 
feasible way. The method can be easily adjusted to take into account two fixed effects it 
would simply imply more interactions.17 
The standard errors for the unemployment rate are corrected to the lack of cross-
sectional variation using an annual clustered standard errors.  
 
                                                             
17 For a more detailed information of this algorithm see Guimarães and Portugal (2009) 
